Path Conditions and Principal Matching: A New Approach to Access Control by Crampton, Jason & Sellwood, James
ar
X
iv
:1
40
6.
49
88
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
9 J
un
 20
14
Path Conditions and Principal Matching:
A New Approach to Access Control
Jason Crampton and James Sellwood
Information Security Group
Royal Holloway, University of London
October 12, 2018
Abstract
Traditional authorization policies are user-centric, in the sense that authorization is de-
fined, ultimately, in terms of user identities. We believe that this user-centric approach is
inappropriate for many applications, and that what should determine authorization is the
relationships that exist between entities in the system. While recent research has considered
the possibility of specifying authorization policies based on the relationships that exist be-
tween peers in social networks, we are not aware of the application of these ideas to general
computing systems. We develop a formal access control model that makes use of ideas from
relationship-based access control and a two-stage method for evaluating policies. Our poli-
cies are defined using path conditions, which are similar to regular expressions. We define
semantics for path conditions, which we use to develop a rigorous method for evaluating
policies. We describe the algorithm required to evaluate policies and establish its complex-
ity. Finally, we illustrate the advantages of our model using an example and describe a
preliminary implementation of our algorithm.
1 Introduction
Access control is an essential security service in any multi-user computer system. It provides
a mechanism by which different users are restricted in the actions they can perform within the
system. An access control service typically comprises a policy decision point and a policy. An
attempt by a user to interact with a system resource, usually known as an authorization request,
is evaluated by the policy decision point and is only permitted if that interaction is authorized
by the policy.
An access control model provides a syntax for authorization policies and a specification of
the algorithm used by the policy decision point to evaluate requests. Many access control models
focus on the user and authorizing the user to perform particular actions. As is customary in the
literature, we will use the terms subjects and objects when referring to the parties who are to,
respectively, perform and be the target of authorization (inter)actions.
Access control has been the subject of significant research and development in the last 40
years. As our use of technology and the connectivity of our devices has increased, the need for
ever more robust and scalable access control models has also grown. New models attempt to
improve on the failings of their predecessors, and often do so by redefining the policy foundations
upon which authorization decisions are made. The protection matrix model, for example, simply
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enumerated all authorized actions. While this provides for precise specification of authorization
policies, it does not scale well and is difficult to manage. In order to ease this administrative
burden, various improvements have been employed by modern operating systems. The Unix
operating system, for example, replaces the individual subjects with a mapping, performed at
the time of request evaluation, to one of three security principals (owner, group and world) [6].
In this way, whilst each object must still be enumerated, the enumeration of subjects is limited to
just these three security principals. With complex systems involving numerous users, this design
dramatically reduces the space and administrative complexity of the underlying policy. However,
it also greatly reduces the flexibility afforded when compared with defining authorization at the
user level.
Role-based access control (RBAC), which is widely used and has been the subject of extensive
research in recent years, assigns a user to one or more organizational roles. These roles are then
authorized to perform certain actions on particular resources. These roles, which are defined on a
per-system basis, thus reduce the administrative burden of the protection matrix (assuming the
number of roles is significantly less than the number of users), and provide a level of flexibility
not available within the Unix model. This increased flexibility also restores some of the clarity
that was lost when users where abstracted behind Unix’s three, very general, security principals.
A significant disadvantage with RBAC is that it takes no account of the specific relationship
that might exist between a user and the resource for which access is requested. Thus every user
assigned to a doctor role can access all electronic health records if the doctor role is authorized
to do so. Clearly, it would more appropriate if the only users that are authorized to access a par-
ticular health record have a specific relationship with the subject of that record. In short, RBAC
is not as “fine-grained” as its supporters claim. RBAC models that use private or parameterized
roles have been introduce to tackle these kinds of problems [9, 10, 14]. However, this often leads
to a proliferation of roles that undermines the advantages provided by the basic RBAC model
(as the number of roles tends towards the number of users). Thus, we believe a new approach
is required: an approach that combines the scalability of RBAC with the granularity of the pro-
tection matrix model and permits the specification of authorization rules on a per user-resource
basis.
Recent research on access control in social networks has used the (social) relationship(s) that
exist between users in such networks as the basis for specifying authorization rules [3, 4, 5, 7].
The relationship information available in social networks provides additional context from which
access control decisions can be derived. We believe that relationship-based access control could
be applied in many other scenarios. In particular, the coarse-grained decision-making in RBAC
can be refined using such relationship information.
In this paper, therefore, we develop a novel access control model in which policies are specified
in terms of path conditions. To a crude approximation our model takes inspiration from three
sources: the overall design of the decision algorithm is similar to Unix; the path conditions are
similar in spirit to some of the proposals for relationship-based access control; and the use of
implementation-specific authorization principals bears some resemblance to RBAC. We believe
our path conditions provide a more rigorous foundation for access control mechanisms than
existing proposals for relationship-based access control. We also believe our use of authorization
principals provides the desired scalability.
Our model introduces several novel contributions, the most significant being a generic model
for access control systems using relationships that is not limited to social networks but can
be used to describe access control within more traditional and more diverse environments. Our
support for logical entities, as well as the more usual users and resources, allows for a fine grained
definition of authorization capable of taking into consideration relevant contextual information
encoded in the relationships a request’s participants have with other entities. This is balanced
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with our abstraction of authorization policy to principals rather than subjects, allowing a scalable
system which remains powerful and expressive.
In the next section, we describe our model for access control. This section includes the defini-
tions of path conditions, principal-matching rules and authorization policies, and an explanation
of how requests are evaluated. In Section 3, we consider the algorithm for matching principals
in more detail, presenting a pseudo-code listing, an analysis of the algorithm’s complexity and
a description of a preliminary implementation in Python. We also describe the results of some
simple experiments. We then compare our model to existing, related work and conclude the
paper with a summary of our contributions and ideas for future work. The appendix includes an
extended example, fragments of which are used throughout the paper. This extended example
is used in our experiments.
2 The Authorization Model
Informally our model is based on the idea of a labelled graph, in which nodes represent entities
within the system and edges represent relationships between entities. Nodes may represent
concrete entities, such as users and resources, or logical entities, with which other entities are
associated. The relationships’ labels are used to define path conditions which can be matched by
chains of edges within the graph. A path condition, essentially, identifies a set of authorization
principals that is associated with a request. Those principals are authorized to perform actions,
thus determining whether a request is authorized or not. Thus our model uses a two-stage
decision process: we first identify the principals relevant to the request and then determine
whether those principals are authorized.
As we allow entities of various types within our graph, we can make use of a variety of kinds
of relationship when processing the authorization decision. If we were to solely include users
within our graph, then it could mimic a social network and would be limited to inter-personal
relationships for access control policy definition. By including group and resource entity types,
we expand the possible subjects and objects, and also the possible relationships which can inform
authorization decisions. In Section 2.5, we show that the RBAC model can be seen as an instance
of our model. If, however, we include additional entity types and relationships then we can make
more fine-grained decisions, as illustrated by the extended example in Appendix A.
2.1 The System Model
Formally, we assume the existence of a set of system entities, which includes the sets of subjects
and objects. Each entity has a type and relationships may exist between certain types of entities.
Some relationships, such as Sibling-of, are symmetric, while others, such as Brother-of, are not.
A system model defines the types along with the entity relationships that are permitted.
Definition 1. A system model comprises a set of types T , a set of relationship labels R, a set of
symmetric relationship labels S ⊆ R and a permissible relationship graph GPR = (VPR, EPR),
where VPR = T and EPR ⊆ T × T ×R.
The example in Appendix A defines a number of types, including Group, Project and User,
and the relationship type Client-of. Part of the permissible relationship graph includes the edges
(Group,Project) and (Group,User), both labelled with the Client-of relationship. Figure 6 (in the
appendix) defines the entire permissible relationship graph.
Definition 2. Given a system model (T,R, S,GPR), a system instance is defined by a system
graph G = (V,E) where V is the set of entities and E ⊆ V × V × R. We say G is well-formed
if for each entity v in V , τ(v) ∈ T , and for every edge (v, v′, r) ∈ E, (τ(v), τ(v′), r) ∈ EPR.
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The system model constrains the ‘shape’ of the system graph by restricting the edges that
can be specified. Note that we may have multiple edges between two entities in our system graph
(because two or more relationships may exist between vertices). Such a graph is sometimes called
a multigraph. We will depict an edge (v, v′, s), when s ∈ S, without arrowheads, as can be seen in
Figure 1 in the case of the Sibling-of relationship. (Due to the symmetry of s, the edge (v, v′, s)
implies an edge (v′, v, s) and vice versa.) An edge (v, v′, r), when r ∈ R \ S, is directed from
v to v′, depicted with an arrowhead pointing towards v′ (see Figure 1a). The directed edges
(v, v′, r) and (v′, v, r) represent two different relationships. Of course both may belong to E, in
which case this will be depicted with arrowheads at both ends of the link between v and v′ (see
Figure 1b).
Alice Bob
Sibling-of
Brother-of
Sister-of
(a)
Chris Bob
Sibling-of
Brother-of
(b)
Figure 1: Illustrating different edges in the system graph
Figure 7 (in the appendix) depicts a system graph containing a substantial number of nodes
of different types and the relationships that exist between those nodes. Figure 2 shows a simple
example of a system graph for illustrative purposes, based on the one in the appendix. Users
(such as U1) are associated with projects (P1); documents (D1 and D2) are grouped together in
folders (F1 and F2) and allocated to one or more projects, either as part of a group or as a single
resource. Relationships include Participant-of, Supervises, Resource-for, and Member-of.
U1 P1 F1
F2D1 D2
Participant-of
Supervises
Resource-for
Member-of
Member-of Member-of
Figure 2: A fragment of a system graph
2.2 Path Conditions
We use path conditions to match requests to principals (described in Section 2.4). In this section,
we define the syntax and semantics of path conditions, and establish some basic properties of
path conditions, thereby allowing us to restrict our attention to simple path conditions.
Definition 3. Given a set of relationships R, we define a path condition recursively:
• ⋄ is a path condition;
• r is a path condition, for all r ∈ R;
• if π and π′ are path conditions, then π ; π′, π+ and π are path conditions.
A path condition of the form r or r, where r ∈ R, is said to be an edge condition.
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Informally, π ; π′ represents the concatenation of two path conditions; π+ represents one or
more occurrences, in sequence, of π; and π represents π reversed. We define ⋄ for completeness.
We note that individual edge conditions could be encoded using attribute-based access control
(ABAC) but it is hard to see how ABAC could be easily employed to encode longer chains of
relationships.
Definition 4. Given a system graph G = (V,E) and u, v ∈ V , we write G, u, v |= π to denote
that G, u and v satisfy path condition π. Formally, for all G, u, v, π, π′:
• G, u, v |= ⋄ iff v = u;
• G, u, v |= r iff (u, v, r) ∈ E;
• G, u, v |= π ; π′ iff there exists w ∈ V such that G, u,w |= π and G,w, v |= π′;
• G, u, v |= π+ iff G, u, v |= π or G, u, v |= π ; π+;
• G, u, v |= π iff G, v, u |= π.
Note that an edge condition is satisfied by nodes that are adjacent in the system graph.
We use ⋄ to identify an empty path condition, which is of particular use in our path-matching
algorithm in Section 3.1.
In the context of the graph in Figure 2, for example, we have G,U1, F1 |= Participant-of ;
Resource-for since G,U1, P1 |= Participant-of and G,F1, P1 |= Resource-for.
Definition 5. Path conditions π and π′ are said to be equivalent, denoted π ≡ π′, if, for all
system graphs G = (V,E) and all u, v ∈ V we have
G, u, v |= π if and only if G, u, v |= π′.
Proposition 1. For all path conditions π1 and π2: (i) π1 ≡ π1 ;⋄ ≡ ⋄ ;π1 (ii) ⋄ ≡ ⋄ (iii) π1 ; π2 ≡
π2 ; π1 (iv) π
+
1 ≡ π1
+.
Proof. All results follow immediately from Definitions 4 and 5. Consider (iii), for example. By
definition, G, u, v |= π1 ; π2 if and only if G, v, u |= π1 ;π2. And G, v, u |= π1 ;π2 if and only there
exists w such that G, v, w |= π1 and G,w, u |= π2. Thus we have G, u, v |= π1 ; π2 if and only if
there exists w such that G,w, v |= π1 and G, u,w |= π2. That is G, u, v |= π2 ; π1.
Definition 6. Given a set of relationships R, we define a simple path condition recursively:
• ⋄, r and r, where r ∈ R, are simple path conditions;
• if π 6= ⋄ and π′ 6= ⋄ are simple path conditions, then π;π′ and π+ are simple path conditions.
In other words, ⋆ occurs in a simple path condition if and only if ⋆ is an element of R. It
follows from Proposition 1 that every path condition may be reduced to a simple path condition.
The path condition r1 ; r2 ; (r1 ; r3)+, for example, can be transformed into the equivalent path
condition (r3 ; r1)
+ ; r1 ; r2 using the equivalences in Proposition 1. Henceforth, we assume all
path conditions are simple.
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2.3 Policy Specification
Subjects within a system request authorization to perform actions on objects. The policies
of a system define the authorized and unauthorized actions and the rules for determining the
principals to which these actions are assigned. Principals are mapped to paths within the system
graph, where these paths exist between the subject and object of an authorization request. The
potential paths are described by path conditions, which are defined using relationships.
Definition 7. Let P be a set of authorization principals and let R be a set of relationship labels.
A principal-matching rule has the form (π, p), where p is an authorization principal and π is
either a path condition defined on R or the special symbol ⊤. The path condition π is called a
principal-matching condition. A principal-matching policy ρ is a list of principal-matching rules.
Informally, a principal-matching rule (π, p) is applicable to a request (s, o, a) if there is a path
from s to o in the system graph that satisfies π.
In order to support scenarios where a default principal should apply, much like the concept of
‘world’ in the Unix access control system, we allow the definition of a special principal-matching
rule with the principal-matching condition set to ⊤. This default principal-matching rule is, if
present, always the last rule in the principal-matching policy and (whenever it is evaluated) is
applicable to every request. This rule’s associated principal, therefore, matches whenever the
rule is evaluated.
Definition 8. An authorization rule has the form (p, ⋆, a, b) or (p, o, a, b), where a is an action,
p is a principal, o is an object and b ∈ {0, 1}. An authorization policy is a list of authorization
rules.
A rule of the form (p, o, a, 0) asserts that p is explicitly unauthorized (or prohibited) to perform
action a on object o, while the rule (p, o, a, 1) explicitly authorizes p. Rules of this form allow
us to specify on a per-object basis the actions for which a principal p is (un)authorized. A rule
of the form (p, ⋆, a, 0) asserts that the principal is unauthorized for all objects, while (p, ⋆, a, 1)
asserts that the principal is authorized for all objects. Rules of this form allow us to specify
the actions for which a principal is (un)authorized, irrespective of the object to which access is
requested. In this case, the authorization policy is concentrated in the principal-matching rule.
Note also that we can combine rules (p, ⋆, a, 0) and (p, o, a, 1), for example, to specify that action
a is generally unauthorized for principal p, but is, as an exception, authorized for object o.
Table 2 (in the appendix) lists the principal-matching rules for our example whilst Table 3
lists the authorization rules. A combination of authorization rules has been used in Table 3 to
ensure that the Project Resource User is specifically unable to write to Func.Spec.#1 whilst other
objects are writable by that principal.
A principal may be explicitly authorized or unauthorized for particular actions. The absence
of any explicit authorization rules may itself be considered an implicit authorization depending
on the default behaviour of the system. A default access control decision (allow or deny) needs
to be specified in the event that no authorization rules apply to a request. Systems may need to
support allow-by-default when the system enters an emergency state, such as the opening of fire
exit doors when there is a fire. Other circumstances will commonly require fail-safe handling,
where a deny-by-default strategy is implemented in order to ensure no unauthorised access is
allowed. Some systems may be deemed so sensitive that there may be no conditions under
which allow-by-default would be enabled. In Section 2.4.3 we discuss the specification of default
strategies in our model.
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2.4 Request Evaluation
Our model for request evaluation is inspired by the Unix access control model and relationship-
based access control models and is summarized in Figure 3. From the Unix model, we take the
idea of binding a request to a principal before computing an access control decision, which we
combine with the idea of specifying authorization policies in terms of relationships. Firstly, we
use the subject and object specified in the request to compute a set of applicable principals.
Then we compute the actions for which those principals are authorized. Finally a decision is
made to allow or deny the request based on those authorizations.
Request
Compute
Principals
Compute
Authorizations
Decision
Figure 3: Processing overview
We now describe request evaluation, which has two main stages and is depicted schematically
in Figure 4, in more detail. The first stage determines a list of matched principals for the request:
in Figure 4 this stage is represented by the horizontal row of steps from ‘START’. The second
stage determines the authorizations explicitly defined for those matched principals identified in
the first stage. This second stage is represented in Figure 4 by the vertical column of steps
beginning at the ‘MP list empty?’ decision point. A conflict resolution process is employed to
resolve any conflicting authorization rules and from this a decision is made.
request
q = (s, o, a)
system
graph
G = (V,E)
principal-
matching
policy ρ
default-
per-subject
default-
per-object
system-
wide
default
START
compute
principals
list of
matched
principals
MP
MP list
empty?
process
rules for no
matching
principal
authorization
decision
principal-
matching
strategy
PMS
author-
ization
policy PA
compute
autho-
rizations
request
q = (s, o, a)
FirstMatch AllMatch
set of
possible
decisions
PD
default
per object
system-
wide
default
DenyOverride AllowOverride PD = ∅?
process
rules for
no explicit
permis-
sions
authorization
decision
FirstMatch
conflict
resolution
strategy
CRS
compute
decision
authorization
decision
Y
N
Y
N
Figure 4: Detailed architecture
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2.4.1 Principal Matching
The list of matched principals is determined by the evaluation of principal-matching rules within
the principal-matching policy. Thus, we first specify what it means for a principal-matching rule
to be matched.
Definition 9. Let q = (s, o, a) be a request and G = (V,E) be a system graph. Then request
q matches principal-matching rule (π, p) if G, s, o |= π. Given a principal-matching policy and
a system graph, we write G, q
pi
−→ p if there exists a principal-matching rule (π, p) and request q
matches (π, p).
Informally, a principal-matching rule maps a (complex) relationship between entities in a
graph to a principal; in other words, a principal-matching rule enables us, conceptually, to replace
a path between two entities with a single edge labelled by a principal. Figure 5 illustrates such
a matching, where request q = (s, o, a) matches a principal-matching rule (r1 ; r2 ; r3 ; r4, p). It is
worth noting that, based on the relationships shown in Figure 5, where r4 is a symmetric label
(identified by the lack of arrows on the edge), the principal-matching rule would also have been
matched if the path condition had been r1 ; r2 ; r3 ; r4.
s v1 v2 v3 o
r1 r2 r3 r4
p
π = r1 ; r2 ; r3 ; r4
Figure 5: Principal-matching rule
A request may match more than one rule in the principal-matching policy. A principal-
matching strategy (PMS) defines how the principals in matched rules should be combined (if at
all). We consider two very natural PMSs: FirstMatch and AllMatch, but other options may be
appropriate in some circumstances. The former evaluates the list of principal-matching rules in
order and terminates when a path condition is matched, returning the corresponding principal.
The latter evaluates the entire list of rules in the policy and returns a list of the principals in
rules for which the request matches the path condition.
If used in conjunction with the FirstMatch PMS, the default principal rule (⊤, p), when
present, would only be triggered, and so only apply, if no other rule matches. When used with
AllMatch this rule would always apply, resulting in the default principal always being added to
the list of matched principals.
An authorization system comprises a principal-matching policy ρ, a principal-matching strat-
egy PMS , an authorization policy PA, and a conflict resolution strategy CRS (described in the
next section). Given an authorization system, a system graph G and a request q, the list of
matched principals MP includes those principals resulting from successful matches made in ac-
cordance with the specified principal-matching strategy. We write G, q
ρ
−→ MP to indicate that
the list of matched principals for q (with respect to policy ρ and system graph G) is MP . If
MP is empty then an authorization decision must be made based on pre-defined defaults. This
process is described in Section 2.4.3.
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2.4.2 Computing Authorizations and Decisions
The second stage of request authorization identifies whether the requested action (on the object)
is explicitly authorized or unauthorized for one or more of the matched principals. Subsequently
any conflicting assignments are resolved and we determine whether the requested action should,
therefore, be allowed or denied.
Definition 10. Given a policy ρ, a request q = (s, o, a) and a system graph G
such that G, q
ρ
−→ MP, we define the set of possible decisions, denoted PD, to be
{b ∈ {0, 1} : (p, o, a, b) ∈ PA, p ∈ MP}.
PD can take one of four values: {0}, {1}, {0, 1} and ∅.
• If PD = {b}, b ∈ {0, 1}, a decision can unambiguously be made (as a deny or allow,
respectively).
• If PD = {0, 1}, we must employ a conflict resolution strategy (CRS) to determine the
decision. We define three conflict resolution strategies: FirstMatch, DenyOverride and Al-
lowOverride. The use of one of these strategies allows a single decision to be made from
the conflicting assignments. In order to support the first of these, we require that the set
of possible decisions be determined by considering each authorization, from the list PA, in
turn.
The FirstMatch CRS takes the first element to be added to PD as the decision. In this
way, if a positive authorization is identified first, then the request is allowed. If a negative
authorization is identified first, however, then the request is denied.
The DenyOverride and AllowOverride CRSs allow their respective elements, 0 and 1, to take
precedence over the alternative, no matter which is identified first.
• The final case is PD = ∅. In this case, the authorization decision must once again be made
using pre-defined defaults, as explained in Section 2.4.3 below.
2.4.3 Defaults
There are two circumstances when default decision making applies. The first is when no matched
principals are identified, whilst the second is, as just described, when the set of possible decisions
is empty.
To accommodate varying needs in these circumstances, we allow for default allow or deny of
a request to be determined at one of the following levels: default-per-subject, default-per-object
or system-wide default. We only support the default-per-subject when there are no matched
principals, and not later, when there are no explicit authorizations. At the time when the set of
possible decisions is determined, the subject is no longer directly relevant, having already been
used to identify the appropriate matched principals. It is therefore unnecessary to reconsider the
subject in order to evaluate the authorization decision.
The three defaults are evaluated in order, where specified, with the first applicable default
determining the authorization decision. In this way, if there is a default specified for the subject
s of the request q = (s, o, a), the subject’s default (allow or deny) applies. If no subject default
is defined for s, then the default for the object o of the request shall apply, if specified. If there
is no subject default for s and no object default for o, then the system-wide default shall apply.
Whilst defaults for the subject and object are optional and may not be specified for the entities
involved in the request, a system-wide default must be specified so as to ensure authorization
decisions can be made in all circumstances.
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2.5 Special Cases
The Unix access control mechanism employs a similar, albeit far simpler, mapping technique as
that used above to identify principals from path conditions [6]. It can, therefore, be trivially
represented using our model. In particular, the system model contains a set of three types: users,
groups and objects, and a set of three relationships (none of which are symmetric): User-object,
User-group and Group-object, which we will label uo, ug and go, respectively. The permissible
relationship graph links the users to the objects and to the groups, as well as linking the groups
to the objects (this is as our relationship naming suggests). There are three principal-matching
rules: (uo, owner), (ug ; go, group) and, the default, (⊤,world). Finally, we use the FirstMatch
PMS and evaluate the rules in the above order.
Note also that we can configure our model to implement core RBAC [2]. We assume the set of
entities is the disjoint union of users, roles, permissions and objects. Then there are two types of
relationship, the User-role relationship, referred to as user assignment and abbreviated ua, along
with the Role-permission relationship, referred to as permission assignment and abbreviated pa.
At its simplest we then define a principal-matching policy where each rule has the form (ua ;pa, p)
where the principal p has the same name as the permission identified by the pa edge. The
authorization policy contains elements (p, ob, op, 1) which map the principals to objects, allowing
them operations (as per the permission binary relation in RBAC).
Additionally, we can introduce the Role-role relationship (abbreviated rr) in order to extend
this configuration to implement a role hierarchy. Finally, we could also introduce the User-
permission relationship (abbreviated up), in order to articulate exceptions to the basic RBAC
model by directly associating permissions with users.
Our model does not directly support the concept of sessions. However, if we were to introduce
support for changing the system graph, we could employ a User-session-role relationship. The
User-session-role relationship may only connect users and roles who are already joined by a
User-role relationship. We then modify the original principal-matching rules to have the form
(usr ; pa, p). Supporting (constrained) updates to the system graph in real time will be an
important aspect of our future work.
3 Path Matching
Principal matching, the first stage of request evaluation, described in Section 2.4.1, is the most
complex part of request evaluation. (The second stage amounts to a sequence of simple lookups
and comparisons.) Principal matching requires us to determine whether there exists a path in
the graph from subject to object that matches a path condition. In this section, we describe the
MatchPrincipal algorithm, which takes a path condition, two nodes (the subject and object of a
request), the set of symmetric relationship labels and a system graph as inputs and returns a
Boolean value indicating whether there exists a matching path in the graph.
The algorithm uses a (modified) breadth-first search to determine whether there exists a path
in the system graph that begins at the subject and ends at the object such that concatenation
of the relationship labels is equal to the path condition. It is employed iteratively to as many
rules in the principal-matching policy as required, given the PMS in use: if FirstMatch is used
then the algorithm is run on each principal-matching rule in turn, until a match is found; if the
AllMatch PMS is used, the algorithm is run for every rule in the policy. In order to determine
satisfaction of a simple path condition, we attempt to satisfy its component edge conditions one
at a time. It is helpful to define the head and suffix of a path condition: the head is used to
match edge labels in the graph, while the suffix determines the residual path condition.
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Definition 11. Let π 6= ⋄ be a simple path condition. Then we define the head and suffix of π,
denoted H(π) and S(π), respectively, as follows:
• H(r) = r and S(r) = ⋄;
• H(r) = r and S(r) = ⋄;
• H(π1 ; π2) = H(π1) and S(π1 ; π2) = S(π1) ; π2;
• H(π+) = H(π) and S(π+) = S(π) ; π∗, where π∗ denotes 0 or more occurrences of π.
Proposition 2. Let π be a simple path condition. Then H(π) is equal to r or r for some r ∈ R.
Moreover, S(π) is a simple path condition.
Proof. The results follow immediately by a simple induction on the structure of simple path
conditions.
Proposition 3. Let π be a simple path condition. Then π ≡ H(π) ; S(π).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of π. Consider the (base) case π = r.
Then
G, u, v |= H(r) ; S(r) ⇔ G, u, v |= r ; ⋄
⇔ G, u, v |= r
Thus H(r) ; S(r) ≡ r, as required. We prove the case π = r in a similar fashion. Now consider
π = π1 ; π2 and assume the result holds for π1 and π2. Then
G, u, v |= H(π1 ; π2) ; S(π1 ; π2)⇔ G, u, v |= H(π1) ; S(π1) ; π2
⇔ G, u, v |= π1 ; π2
Finally, consider π+ and assume the result holds for π. Then
G, u, v |= H(π+) ; S(π+)⇔ G, u, v |= H(π) ; S(π) ; π∗
⇔ G, u, v |= π ; π∗
⇔ G, u, v |= π+
concluding the proof.
We now develop the path-matching algorithm in more detail.
3.1 The Path-Matching Algorithm
The algorithm takes a start node (the subject), a target node (the object) and a path condition
as part of its input. The current node is initialized to be the start node. The path-matching
algorithm traverses the provided system graph ‘consuming’ the head of the path condition as it
matches it against (one or more of) the relationship labels associated with incident edges of the
current node. It then considers each of the adjacent edges in turn replacing the path condition
with the relevant suffix. The algorithm terminates if it ‘consumes’ the entire path condition with
the adjacent node equal to the target node or if no further matches can be made.
If we consider, for example, the graph in Figure 5, the request (s, o, a) and path condition
r1 ; r2, then H(r1 ; r2) = r1, which is the label on edge (s, v1, r1). Hence, the edge is traversed
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and we next consider the node v1 with path condition S(r1 ; r2) = r2. The algorithm terminates
at this point (returning false) because there is no outgoing edge from v1 labelled r2.
The MatchPrincipal algorithm (listed in Algorithm 1) is, essentially, a modified breadth-first
search algorithm. However, there are some awkward aspects to the design of the algorithm.
First, we have to allow for nodes to be revisited. Second, we have to allow matching of edge
conditions of the form r and r. Finally, our algorithm has to be able to handle path conditions
of the form π+ without entering an endless loop, in order for the algorithm to terminate.
The algorithm uses a queue Q to track nodes that we have to visit. Unlike a conventional
breadth-first search, we allow those nodes to be revisited because path conditions may be satisfied
by a cycle in the system graph. However, if we revisit a node then we require a different non-
empty path condition on each visit. In this way we avoid infinite loops whilst processing the
path condition.
Previously visited nodes, and the path condition at the time of the visit, are tracked using
the set SEEN . At each node h we visit, we identify incident edges from our system graph
G = (V,E), it is these edges that we attempt to traverse by matching a label to the head of
our path condition. Matched edges result in path condition suffixes relevant at specific adjacent
nodes; we hold these in a list as node-suffix pairs. We use the notation list1 ⊔ list2 to indicate
the concatenation of two lists, where the entries from list2 are appended, in order, to the end of
list1.
The algorithm performs its edge condition matching in lines 8 to 22 and 23 to 37 for out-
going and incoming edges to the current node h respectively. However, the implementation is
complicated by the handling of path conditions of the form π+, whose suffix includes π∗ (see
Proposition 3), which may represent 0 occurrences of π or at least one occurrence of π. When
processing path conditions, therefore, we first determine if it has the structure π∗1 ; π2 (where π2
may be ⋄) and, if so, we treat it as π+1 ;π2; in addition we add π2 (corresponding to 0 occurrences
of π1), along with the current node h, to our list of node-suffix pairs for consideration later (see
Algorithm 1 lines 10 to 13 and 25 to 28).
After an edge condition is matched by the algorithm, each node-suffix pair is checked against
SEEN and ignored if previously processed. The suffix φs of each unseen tuple is compared to
⋄, those matching indicate fully processed path conditions. If the node n associated with such a
tuple is equal to the target node v then the path condition is considered to have been matched
between u and v and the algorithm returns true. If the node isn’t the target node, then the tuple
is discarded as there is no remaining path condition to evaluate. Those unseen tuples, whose
suffixes are not ⋄, are added to the queue of nodes to be visited (see Algorithm 1 lines 38 to 50).
Once all incident edges are considered for the current node, we move to the next node as
indicated by the next entry in the queue Q. If the queue is empty and we have not already
returned a value, then the path condition cannot be matched (because there are no further
nodes to examine) and the algorithm returns false (see Algorithm 1 lines 5, 6 and 52).
Consider, for example, the system graph depicted in Figure 5 and the path condition r+1 ;
r2 ; r3 ; r4 with start node s and end node o. Then we are able to match edge condition r1 and
progress to node v1 with path condition r
∗
1 ;r2 ; r3 ;r4. We now attempt to match r1 again, which
fails. In addition, we add (v1, r2 ;r3 ;r4) to the list of node-path condition pairs to consider. This
will, eventually, lead to the node-suffix pair (o, ⋄) being identified, at which point the algorithm
will return a match (for path condition r+1 ; r2 ; r3 ; r4 with start and end nodes s and o).
3.2 Correctness and Complexity
We first introduce the concept of the length of a simple path condition. Informally, it is equal
to the number of edge conditions (r or r) which it contains.
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Algorithm 1 MatchPrincipal
Require: Graph G = (V, E), set of symmetric relationship labels S, nodes u and v, and path condition pi
Ensure: Returns true if G, u, v |= pi and false if it does not
1: Initialize empty queue Q
2: Initialize empty set of visited nodes SEEN
3: add (u, pi) to Q
4: SEEN = SEEN ∪ {(u, pi)}
5: while Q is not empty do
6: dequeue next entry (h, φ) from Q
7: Initialize empty list of (node, suffix) tuples Θ
8: // consider edges directed away from h
9: for each edge (h, w, r) ∈ E do
10: if φ = pi∗
1
; pi2 then
11: Θ = Θ ⊔ [(h, pi2)]
12: φ = pi+
1
; pi2
13: end if
14: if H(φ) = r then
15: Θ = Θ ⊔ [(w,S(φ))]
16: end if
17: if (r ∈ S and (w, h, r) 6∈ E) then
18: if H(φ) = r then
19: Θ = Θ ⊔ [(w,S(φ))]
20: end if
21: end if
22: end for
23: // consider edges directed towards h
24: for each edge (w, h, r) ∈ E do
25: if φ = pi∗
1
; pi2 then
26: Θ = Θ ⊔ [(h, pi2)]
27: φ = pi+
1
; pi2
28: end if
29: if H(φ) = r then
30: Θ = Θ ⊔ [(w,S(φ))]
31: end if
32: if (r ∈ S and (h,w, r) 6∈ E) then
33: if H(φ) = r then
34: Θ = Θ ⊔ [(w,S(φ))]
35: end if
36: end if
37: end for
38: // determine match or other nodes to visit
39: for each (n, φs) ∈ Θ do
40: if (n, φs) 6∈ SEEN then
41: if φs = ⋄ then
42: if n = v then
43: return true // match
44: end if
45: else
46: add (n, φs) to Q
47: SEEN = SEEN ∪ {(n, φs)}
48: end if
49: end if
50: end for
51: end while
52: return false // no match
Definition 12. The length ℓ(π) of simple path condition π is defined as follows:
• ℓ(r) = ℓ(r) = 1;
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• ℓ(π ; π′) = ℓ(π) + ℓ(π′);
• ℓ(π+) = ℓ(π).
The length ℓ(ρ) of a principal-matching policy ρ is equal to the length of the longest path condition
of the principal-matching rules within ρ, ℓ(ρ) = max
pi∈ρ
(ℓ(π)).
Our algorithm terminates because, with one exception discussed below, ℓ(S(π)) = ℓ(π) − 1
because an edge is consumed in matching the head of the path condition. Thus, any node-suffix
pair that is enqueued contains a shorter path condition. Eventually, the path condition will be
reduced to ⋄ and we test whether the adjacent node is the target node. The exception arises when
we consider a path condition of the form π∗ ;π′. In this case, we enqueue a path condition of the
form π′ and also evaluate the path condition π+ ;π′. Thus, we could, in the worst case visit every
node in the system graph and evaluate the path condition π+ ;π′. However, we do not enqueue a
node-suffix pair if we have previously evaluated it (in the same way that a normal breadth-first
search keeps track of visited nodes). Thus, for this exceptional case, we will eventually process
the path condition π′ (since π+ ; π′ will either be discarded or fail to find a matching edge).
We can summarise our path-matching algorithm’s processing as a breadth-first search through
the graph, attempting to match edges to the remaining path condition. At each node the
number of possible comparisons depends on the degree of that node. The path condition under
consideration is re-written as each edge comparison is performed, with the head of the path
condition removed if the edge satisfied the next element in the path condition. The path condition
under consideration at adjacent nodes is, therefore, one element shorter than at the current one.
The time complexity of a standard breadth-first search is determined by the number of nodes
and edges, since, in the worst case, each node and edge will be explored. For the PrincipalMatch
algorithm, the number of “nodes” is determined by the number of nodes in the system graph
and the length of the path condition. Specifically, the size of the queue is bounded by |V | · ℓ(φ).
The number of edges in the system graph is O(|V |2 · |R|). Thus, the total complexity of the
algorithm is O(|V | · ℓ(φ) + |V |2 · |R|).
The MatchPrincipal algorithm determines whether a single path condition matches. In order
to compute the list of matching principals in the worst case, every rule in the principal-matching
policy ρ may need to be evaluated. The worst-case time complexity of principal matching is,
therefore, determined by the complexity of matching one rule, the number of rules in the policy
and ℓ(ρ).
3.3 Implementation
We have created a Python implementation of the MatchPrincipal algorithm which roughly follows
the structure shown in Algorithm 1. We represent a path condition as a tree of nodes, where
each node is a data structure containing (i) pointers to a left and a right node (ii) a relationship
label if it is a leaf node (iii) a node type if the node is a non-leaf node (indicating the operation
used to construct the path condition). Our implementation modifies the pseudo-code listed in
Algorithm 1 in order to improve the processing of path conditions containing π∗. In particular,
we process both possibilities for π∗ when we meet it, rather than simply putting one aside for
consideration later (as we do in lines 11 and 26 of Algorithm 1).
Using this implementation we evaluated the requests in our appendix example. The results
are summarized in Table 1, which shows the number of nodes visited (n) and edges considered
(e) during the evaluation of one specific principal-matching rule for each of these requests.
Notice that the algorithm may visit many more nodes than exist on the shortest path between
the subject and object of the request. This is because we are using a breadth-first search. Notice
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Path condition π ℓ(π) Request n e Found
P ; R ;M
+
3 (Sales.#2,Func.Spec.#1,write) 5 19 Yes
P ; R ;M
+
3 (Tech.#2,Test.Spec.#1, read) 7 24 Yes
S ; R ;M
+
3 (Tech.#2,Func.Spec.#1,write) 4 15 Yes
S+ ;M ; S ; D ;M
+
5 (CTO,Proj.#1 Report#1, read) 17 58 Yes
S+ ;M ; S ; D ;M
+
5 (CEO,Proj.#1 Report#1, read) 7 24 No
Table 1: Running our implementation of MatchPrincipal using path conditions and requests from
Tables 2 and 4
also that two different subject nodes may be the same distance from the object node (as is
the case for the subjects in the first and second rows) and yet one request is resolved with less
computational effort. It would be interesting to see whether there is any advantage to be gained
in using a depth-first search. This is certainly something we hope to investigate in future work.
4 Related Work
We have already noted those aspects of the Unix access control model and role-based access
control that have influenced the design of our model. Our work also takes inspiration from the
formal model developed for Unix by Crampton [6], which suggested that the two-stage evaluation
process used by Unix could provide inspiration for novel relationship-based access control models.
We now compare our model with related work in the literature.
The widespread use of social networks and restricting the access to resources within such
networks has inspired the development of research into relationship-based access control. The
early work of Kruk et al. used friend and friend-of-a-friend relationships to determine access to
resources [12], while the work of Ali et al. was based on the trust relationships between users [1].
Carminati et al. synthesized these elements to create an access control model for social networks
based on relationships [3]. They represent a social network as a graph in which the edges are
labelled by relationships (such as friend) and all nodes represent users. Each edge is also labelled
with a trust value, indicating the “strength” of the relationship. An access condition has the
form (u, r, d, t), where u is a user, r is a relationship label, d is the depth and t is the trust
threshold. An access rule has the form (o, C), where o is an object and C is a set of access
conditions. A user v is authorized to access the resource o if v satisfies the access conditions
specified in C. More recent work has built on this model to provide additional features, such as
joint management of access policies, but only in the context of social networks [11].
If we ignore the trust threshold, access conditions are a special case of path conditions.
Specifically a relationship r of depth d can be represented by the path condition r ; . . . ; r
(repeated d times). Moreover, we can specify relationships of unbounded depth using the path
condition r+. However, access conditions certainly cannot represent arbitrary path conditions.
In other words, our approach significantly extends the possibilities for policy specification. (Trust
thresholds may be useful in social networks, but we feel their use for our intended applications is
inappropriate. Of course, our framework may be easily adapted to accommodate trust thresholds
by having a path condition built from pairs of the form (r, t), where r is a relationship label and
t is a threshold.)
Fong’s recent work on relationship-based access control also concentrates on access control
in social networks and models the social network as a graph in which the edges are labelled
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by relationships and all nodes are users [7, 8]. Fong’s work specifies a policy for each resource,
where a policy is specified using a multi-modal logic.1 Thus Fong’s work provides a richer policy
language than that of Carminati et al. The policy syntax is specified by the grammar
φ, ψ ::= ⊤ | a | ¬φ | φ ∨ ψ | 〈i〉φ
where i is a relationship identifier. Informally, ⊤ serves the same purpose as our default path
condition ⊤; a is analogous to ⋄; 〈i〉 is equivalent to our path condition r. Fong’s language
can encode alternatives (using ∨); we would simply specify alternative principal-matching rules.
Fong’s language does support negation, which we do not. Conversely, our language does support
unbounded path conditions, which are useful when traversing a sub-graph comprising similar
types of elements that might have arbitrary diameter (as in a directory tree, for example). A
limitation of Fong’s language is that a policy has to be specified for every resource and admits
no relationships, other than ownership, between users and resources. In our approach, we simply
identify the principals that apply to a request, given the subject and object of the request, thereby
leveraging some of the advantages of a role-based approach. Moreover, we allow for arbitrary
relationships between the nodes (subject to the constraints in the permissible relationship graph)
in the system graph.
Cheng et al. also focused on the use of relationship-based access control within Online Social
Networks [4, 5]. Their work allows for the specification of user-to-resource relationships (other
than ownership). However, our model is more general still in its support for entities of any kind
(including logical ones) and policies not focused on, but still applicable to, social networks. Cheng
et al. employ a path checking algorithm which is comparable to our concept of path matching.
However, their approach directly assigns permissions, whereas we introduce some of the benefits
of RBAC and Unix access control by abstracting that assignment to matched principals. Their
path expressions are directly based on regular expressions, including wildcards, although they
constrain rules containing wildcards so that such rules could, in fact, be enumerated as different
alternatives. (Thus paths of arbitrary length are not properly supported.) In contrast, we only
provide direct support for π+ in path conditions, but do not limit the number of edges across
which it can match, something that is crucial when dealing with variable depth data structures
such as directory trees. Moreover, as we have seen, we can encode alternation in a rule’s path
condition as two (or more rules): the rule (π1 | π2, p) is simply defined as two principal-matching
rules (π1, p) and (π2, p). Similarly, we can handle (π
∗, p) by defining the rules (π+, p) and (⋄, p).
5 Conclusion
We have formally defined a new graph-based model for access control based on two concepts:
path conditions and principal matching. We believe that path conditions are a novel contribution
to the literature on relationship-based access control and that these conditions allow us to specify
a wide range of policies that are relevant to access control in a wide range of applications, not just
in the usual context of social networks. Principal matching enables us to leverage the advantages
of both Unix and RBAC and extend the capabilities of both models. We also believe our
model provides significant advantages over existing models for relationship-based access control,
both in terms of the expressive power of path conditions and the relatively straightforward
request evaluation process. Additionally, our model is generic, thus able to describe systems of
various forms be they social networks, IT systems (singularly or as networks) or entire businesses.
1The rationale for using a modal logic is that each relationship specifies an accessibility relation between users,
which is used to provide semantics for policies. We do this more directly by working with path conditions and
specifying their semantics in terms of a graph.
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We have illustrated how the model can be implemented by describing an algorithm to support
principal matching and, thereby, enable request evaluation within our model.
There are many opportunities for further work. In particular, we would like to investigate
alternative path-matching algorithms and compare their efficiency with the one described in
Section 3. SPARQL is an RDF query language that may well be an suitable alternative. We
would also like to extend the policy language to include more expressive matching as a means of
directly supporting access constraints such as separation of duty, binding of duty and Chinese
Wall. We believe that such constraints can be supported simply by introducing conjunction
within, and negation of, path conditions. Extending this further we plan to consider the matching
of subgraphs, rather than paths, and to investigate the trade-offs in increased expressive power
with the more expensive request evaluation algorithms that will be required. We also intend
to develop an administrative model to manage components such as the system graph. In this
way, we should be able to handle dynamic concepts, such as sessions in RBAC. RT is a family
of role-based trust management languages [13] that combine features of RBAC with distributed
access control models. Many of the rules of RT can, like the assignment relations in RBAC, be
encoded as a single type of relationship within a system graph in our model. However, the RT
delegation rule A.r ← A′.r′.r′′ cannot be directly encoded within our model. We would like to
be able to provide support for distributed access control, in which different parts of the subgraph
form different administrative domains. Then RT-like rules would specify the edges that link
different subgraphs. Finally, we would also like to enrich the model with stateful objects, such
as workflow tasks, for which the set of authorized individuals may change over time. We expect
that this will result in the system graph being updated as the state of an object changes (for
example to support task-based separation of duty).
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A Corporate Example
The following example applies our model to the project environment within a fictional company.
To support this specific system, we initially define the underlying system model (T,R, S,GPR)
where the set of types is
T = {File,Folder,Group,Printer,Project,User}
The set of relationship labels used in the system model is
R = {Client-of,Deliverable-for,Member-of,
Participant-of,Resource-for,Supervises}
There are no symmetric relationship labels. Finally, the permissible relationship graph GPR,
defined using T and R, is shown in Figure 6.
Using this system model we then describe the project environment using the system graph
shown in Figure 7.
Within our authorization system we define the principal-matching rules shown in Table 2 and
make use of the AllMatch PMS.
# Principal-Matching Rule
1 (C ; D ;M
+
,Deliverable Client)
2 (S+ ;M ; S ; D,Deliverable Reviewer)
3 (S+ ;M ; S ; D ;M
+
,Deliverable Reviewer)
4 (S ; D,Deliverable Supervisor)
5 (S ; D ;M
+
,Deliverable Supervisor)
6 (P ; D,Deliverable User)
7 (P ; D ;M
+
,Deliverable User)
8 (S ; R,Project Resource Supervisor)
9 (S ; R ;M
+
,Project Resource Supervisor)
10 (P ; R,Project Resource User)
11 (P ; R ;M
+
,Project Resource User)
12 (M ; R,Team Resource User)
Table 2: Principal-matching policy
Additionally, we define the authorization policy shown in Table 3 and whilst we define no
per-subject or per-object defaults, we define the system-wide default as deny-by-default. We
employ the FirstMatch conflict resolution strategy.
Table 4 lists some illustrative requests, together with the result of their
evaluation. Requests 1 and 2 would result in the list of matched principals
[Project Resource Supervisor,Project Resource User]. Requests 3 and 4 would result in the
matched principal lists [Project Resource User] and [Deliverable reviewer], respectively, while the
final request would match no principals.
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Figure 6: Permissible relationship graph
20
Figure 7: System graph
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# Authorization Rule
1 (Deliverable Client, ⋆, read, 1)
2 (Deliverable Reviewer, ⋆, read, 1)
3 (Deliverable Supervisor, ⋆, read, 1)
4 (Deliverable Supervisor, ⋆,write, 1)
5 (Deliverable User, ⋆, read, 1)
6 (Project Resource Supervisor, ⋆, read, 1)
7 (Project Resource Supervisor, ⋆,write, 1)
8 (Project Resource User, ⋆, read, 1)
9 (Project Resource User,Func.Spec.#1,write, 0)
10 (Project Resource User, ⋆,write, 1)
11 (Team Resource User, ⋆,write, 1)
Table 3: Authorization policy
# Request Decision set Outcome Comment
1 (Tech.#2,Test.Spec.#1, read) {1} Allow
2 (Tech.#2,Func.Spec.#1,write) {1, 0} Allow First match
3 (Sales.#2,Func.Spec.#1,write) {0} Deny
4 (CTO,Proj.#1 Report#1, read) {1} Allow
5 (CEO,Proj.#1 Report#1, read) {} Deny System default
Table 4: Sample requests
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